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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
and within the scope of his employment. The statute, in imposing liability,
did not divorce the master-servant relationship from the negligence liability.
The act says liability "according to the law of the place"3 0 and the courts
ought to so enforce it. If the courts deem it an incursion into the federal
sphere, the remedy lies with Congress and not in judicial legislation.

TORTS-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTE-STATUS OF
UNLAWFULLY EMPLOYED MINOR
Parents of deceased nine-year-old unlawfully' employed child brought
an action under the wrongful death statute. 2 Defendant pleaded that the
exclusive remedy is under the Workmen's Compensation Statute.3 Held,
a child who could not be lawfully employed is not an employee under the
Workmen's Compensation Statute, 4 and therefore, the action under the
wrongful death statute is not barred. Smith v. Arnold, 60 So.2d 281
(Fla. 1952).
There are essentially three different types of statutory provisions
relating to minors in the existing workmen's compensation laws.' In the
first category, only minors who are legally permitted to work are included.
The courts generally hold that the child's employment must not violate
any child labor law provision in order to come under the actY The second
type of statute does not mention minors specificially but includes all
employees under a contract of hire.' Though some courts at first were
reluctant to include minors illegally employed,8 the tendency has been to
include them because there exists a voidable contract of employment which
a minor, who has committed no wrong, may assert for his own benefit.'
Other courts add that minors should be entitled to the beneficial effects
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
1. FLA.
2.FLA,

3. FLA.

STAT. § 450.03 (1951).
STAT. §§ 768.01, 768.02, 768.03 (1951).
STAT. C. 440; § 440.11 (1951).
STAT. § 440.02 (2) (1951) (which defines

4. FLA.
employee as "including minors
whether lawfully or unlawfully employed).
5. See Comment, Recovery Under Workmen's Comp. Act for Death of a Minor, 7
MONT. L. REV. 82 (1946).
6. Messmer v. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 562, 118 N.E. 993 (1918); Kruczkowski v.
Polonia Publishing Co., 203 Mich. 211, 168 N.W. 932 (1918); Westerlund v. Kettle
River Co., 137 Minn. 24, 162 N.W. 680 (1917); Acklin Stamping Co. v. Kutz, 98 Ohio
St. 61, 120 N.E. 229 (1918); Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 156 P.2d 885
(Utah 1945) (minor working in a prohibited occupation).

7. See note 5 supra.

8. Widdoes v. Laub, 33 Del. 4, 129 At]. 344 (1925); Sechlich v. Harris-Emery Co.,
184 Iowa 1025, 169 N.W. 325 (1918); Hetzel v. Wasson Piston Ring Co., 89 N.J.L. 205,
98 Atl. 308 (1916); Rock Island Coal Mining Co. v. Gilliam, 89 Okla. 49, 213 Pac. 833
(1923); Gilley v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 35 S.W. 136 (Texas 1931) (employment contract
in violation of child labor law not valid).
9. Greenberg v. Guliano, 131 Conn. 157, 38 A.2d 436 (1944); Pierce's Case, 267
Mass. 140, 166 N.E. 636 (1929); Noreen v. William Vogel and Bros., 231 N.Y. 317,
132 N.E. 102 (1921); Kociolowiz v. Tonawanda Corrugated Box Co., 252 App. Div. 716,
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of workmen's compensation. 0

In some jurisdictions, when the courts

persisted in not including unlawfully employed minors, the legislatures ha'Ve
amended the statutes to explicitly include them."
The third type of act and the one obtaining in Florida,' 2 includes
minors "whether lawfully or unlawfully employed."' 3 Where the occupation is permissible, a child without the required working paper, and therefore unlawfully employed, was held to be under the act. 14 A Montana
Court has held that even where a child was employed in a prohibited
occupation, the child still came under this provision." The court said
the statute makes "wholly immaterial the age or competency of the minors
and the capacity of the minor to contract, as well as the lawfulness of
the object of employment."' 6 A vigorous dissent stated that the decision
would encourage the employment of minors, and relieve the employer of
liability, rather than furnishing protection for minors. '
Where a person is included under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, that act ordinarily offers the exclusive remedy and any other form
of recovery is barred.' 7 Thus the injured employee is freed from the
common law action which is subject to the employer's defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, the fellow-servant doctrine and to those
delays which the Workmen's Compensation Statute was designed to
prevent.'
The court in the instant case has not followed the present trend of
including the unlawfully employed minor under the statute wherever
possible.' 9 The court seemed to reason that the legislature intended to
include only those minors who were of an age- to be lawfully employed.
To include any others would be to render ineffective the provisions of the
child labor law. Every employer has a duty to society to obey the child
labor law and if he hires children he assumes full responsibility and "cannot
298 N.Y.Supp. 844 (1937); Humphries v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S.E. 890
(1926); Rasi v. Howard Manufacturing Co., 109 Wash. 524, 187 Pac. 327 (1920).
10. Keriez v. Novelty Compact Leather Co., 111 Conn. 229, 149 At]. 679 (1930);
Noreen v. William Vogel and Bros., 231 N.Y. 317, 132 N.E. 102 (1921); Humphries v.
Boxicy Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S.E. 890 (1926).
11. See S. H. Kress & Co. v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 66 Ariz. 67, 182
P.2d 931 (1947); Dawson v. Acme Evans, Inc., 118 Ind. App. 49, 75 N.E.2d 553 (1947);
Fritsch v. Pennsylvania Golf Club, 355 Pa. 384, 50 A.2d 207 (1947); Hawkins v. Cherry,

202 S.W.2d 691 (Texas 1947).
12. See note 4 supra.

13. See note 5 gupra.
14. Cummins v. J. J. Newberry Co., 211 Ark. 854, 203 S.W.2d 187 (1947).
15. Tarrant v. Helena Building & Realty Co., 116 Mont. 319, 156 P.2d 168 (1944).
See also S. H. Kress & Co. v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 66 Ariz. 67, 182 P.2d
931 (1947).
16. Tarrant v. Helena Building & Realty Co., 116 Mont. 319, 156 P.2d 168 (1944").
17.

HOROWITZ ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATiON,

18. See note 10 suPra.
19. See note 11 supra.

316 et seq. (1944).
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hide behind the protective provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act." 20
While the present decision was equitable in that a holding to the
contrary would have limited recovery to funeral expenses,2 1 the far-reaching
effects of the decision might bring future inequities. That a child may be
forced to pursue his common law remedy is evident, and it appears that
the court in deciding the instant case in a just manner has assumed the
prerogative of legislation.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - INJURY BY ACCIDENT
STRAIN AND EXERTION

i

Claimant, a waitress, while in the course of her employment, received

an arm injury by lifting a heavy container. She seeks recovery under the
Florida Workmen's Compensation Act.1 Held, that claimant is entitled
to compensation. An unexpected injury received in the usual performance
of an ordinary duty falls within the meaning of "injury by accident."
Bonnie Gray Y. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., --So.2d
- (Fla. 1952).*
The term "accident" has been a part of Workmen's Compensation
law since its adoption in England in 1897,2 and is to be found in most
compensation statutes today.' The states which have not adopted the
term by statute have done so by judicial interpretation.4 "Accident" has
been defined as an unexpected incident which occurs unintentionally.5
The Florida act, in particular, provides that an "accident" is "an unexpected or unusual event, happening suddenly."' No stated period can
be termed "sudden" as it depends upon the circumstances of each case.7
Two elements have been held to be necessary for an accident: (1) an
unexpected cause,8 such as a slip, fall or misstep9 and (2) an unexpected
20. Smith v. Arnold, 60 So.2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1952).
21. The parents were certainly not dependent on the child.
*Editor's note: This case is scheduled for rehearing and has not been reported
by publication deadline.
1. FLA.

440.01 et seq. (1949).

STAT. §

2. Burton, The Dilemma of Accident In Workmen's Compensation Laws (Address
at the Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Association of State Compensation Insurance Funds, Miami Beach, Florida, November 1952).
3. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw 511 § 37.10 (found that "accident"
appears as a noun or modifier in forty-two Workmen's Compensation Act statutes).

4. See note 2 supra.
5. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 37.00;
1951).

6. FLA.

STAT.

§ 440.02 (19)

(1949); Burton, Florida Workmen's Compensation

1935 to 1950, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 81, § IV (1950).
7.
8.
9.
(1945),

Kress & Co. v. Burkes,
See note, 17 FLA. L.J.
Compare Cleary Bros.
with Davis v. Artley

BrAcx, LAw DICTIONARY 30 (4th ed

153 Fla. 868, 16 So.2d 106 (1944).
28 (1943).
Construction Co. v. Nobles, 156 Fla. 408, 23 So.2d 525
Construction Co., 154 Fla. 481, 18 So.2d 255 (1944).

